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DIAGNOSTIC EVIDENCE ADMISSIBILITY AND THE MULTIPLE
PERSONALITY DISORDER DEFENSE
I. INTRODUCTION
Archbishop Littmann felt a tap on his shoulder. Startled, he
turned. He began to smile, then saw the knife. Confusion
turned to fear as he attempted to shield himself from the
slashes. Nineteen-year-old Jared, the Bishop's favorite altar
boy, found himself huddled in a. confessional. He was cov-
ered with blood and holding a knife. Panic-stricken, Jared
didn't know what happened; he didn't know what happened
because someone else killed the Bishop, not another person
- but another personality.
1
The growing recognition of psychiatric conditions resulting from
childhood trauma2 has become a significant mental health issue of
the 1990s.' One such condition that has become significant in a legal
context is Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID), better known as Multi-
ple Personality Disorder. Over the last few decades, criminal defend-
ants have increasingly raised insanity defenses based on DID in cases
ranging from drunk driving to murder.4
Although insanity defenses based on mental illness are common,
defenses based on DID are unique. Defendants in DID cases allege
that more than one personality inhabits their body, and thus, they
1. This illustrative scenario is an adaptation of the book PrimalFear, written by William
Diehl. WILLIAM DIEHL, PRIMAL F.AR (1993).
2. "Psychological trauma" is an event that is outside the range of usual human experi-
ence and which is so seriously distressing as to overwhelm the mind's defenses and cause
lasting emotional harm. THE SIDRAN FOUNDATION, PSYcTRAuMA GLOSSARY, 20 (1995)
[hereinafter PsYcTRAuMA GLOSSARY].
3. SeeTHE SIDRAN FOUNDATION, DissociAT InENrrTv DISORDER (MULTIPLE PERSONAL.
rry DISORDER) (1994).
4. See Sabra M. Owens, Criminal Responsibility and Multiple Personality Defendants,
MENTAL & PHYSiCAL DISABILITY L. REP. 133, 140-143 (1997) (calculating percentage of in-
sanity pleas based on a comprehensive analysis of DID criminal cases). Insanity test appli-
cation is particularly important in a DID context because 55% of DID defendants enter an
insanity plea. See id. Criminal courts hearing DID cases have overwhelmingly agreed that a
diagnosis of DID alone is insufficient to support a not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI)
plea. See. id. at 134-35. Thus, without a corresponding lack of mens rea, a DID diagnosis is
insufficient for exculpation. See id. While determining mens rea for most defendants is
complex, in DID cases, it is particularly difficult. See id; see also Dorothy Otnow Lewis &
Jennifer S. Bard, Multiple Personality and Forensic Issues, 14 PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS NORTH AM.
No. 3, 741, 741 (1991). In civil cases, DID arises in a wide variety of situations such as
parental termination, sexual assault, medical malpractice, and disability benefit
application.
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should not be held responsible for the actions of an alternate person-
ality.' Essentially, DID defendants argue that their various personali-
ties should be granted separate legal status. Because DID as a
diagnosis and as a defense is controversial,6 evaluating a defendant's
criminal culpability is an exceptionally complex task.7 As recently as
1993, the Supreme Court of Washington, in State v. Wheaton,8 held a
special evidentiary hearing to determine whether DID was sufficiently
accepted in the psychiatric community so as to be legally admissible.9
Expert testimony is given to support or deny a diagnosis of DID,
as well as to identify the disorder's effect on a person's behavior and
state of mind.'" A wide variety of diagnostic evidence is presented in
DID cases. This evidence, often controversial, includes clinical inter-
views -structured and unstructured, as well as hypnotic and sodium
amytal induced"l- psychological test results, psychotherapy records
and reports, physiological test results and observations, social service,
5. For example, in Ohio v. Grimsley, Robin Grimsley was convicted of driving while
under the influence of alcohol. 444 N.E.2d 1071, 1072 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982). She had
been diagnosed with DID and claimed that she should not be held responsible for the
offense because, at the time of the crime, she was dissociated from her primary personality
and was in the state of consciousness of a secondary personality named Jennifer. See id.
She contended that she was not acting consciously or voluntarily. See iL The court de-
cided that Grimsley was culpable because it was immaterial what state of consciousness or
personality she was in as long as the personality controlling her behavior was conscious and
aware of her actions. See id; see also Felicia G. Rubenstein, Committing Crimes While Experienc-
ing a True Dissociative State: The Multiple Personality Defense and Appropriate Criminal Responsi-
bility, 38 WAYNE L. REv. 353, 355 (1992).
6. See H. Merskey, The Manufacture of Personalities, 160 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 327, 328
(1992); see generally Jacqueline R. Kanovitz et al., Witnesses with Multiple Personality Disorder,
23 PEPP. L. REv. 387 (1996); Elyn Saks, Multiple Personality Disorder and Criminal Culpability,
25 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 383 (1992).
7. In civil cases, DID has perplexed the legal system as well. At least one civil party has
even claimed DID as an affirmative defense to adultery. See Rutherford v. Rutherford, 401
S.E.2d 177, 179 (S.C. Ct. App. 1990) (claiming that because the alternate personality com-
mitted adultery while the host was unaware, the host should not be held responsible).
8. 850 P.2d 507 (Wash. 1993).
9. Id. at 508. In 1993 the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders
(DSM-III) still referred to DID as Multiple Personality Disorder. See infra note 17.
10. See David B. Savitz, The Legal Defense of Persons with the Diagnosis of Multiple Personality
Disorder, 3 DISSOCIATION 195, 201 (1990) (explaining the primary testimonial responsibili-
ties of mental health experts).
11. "Sodium amytal" is a barbiturate used extensively as a sedative and hypnotic. It is
sometimes called truth serum because under its influence inhibitions may be lowered with
the result that individuals discuss problems more freely. J. P. CHAPLIN, DIcrIONARV OF PSY-
CHOLOc;Y 23 (1985). Sodium amytal is occasionally used in psychotherapy with trauma
clients to access repressed or unconscious feelings and memories. PsycTRAuMA GLOSSARY,
supra note 2, at 18. An intravenous drip infused with sodium amytal, is usually done on an
inpatient basis due to the slight risk of medical complications. See id.
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medical and school records, family interviews, and to a lesser extent,
polygraphy, artwork interpretation and writing analysis.'
2
Part II of this article defines DID and the other Dissociative Disor-
ders, 3 and explains potential effects on behavior and mental state.
Part III examines expert testimony and evidentiary admissibility stan-
dards. Part IV examines various types of forensic evidence presented
in DID cases. Part V examines common areas of diagnostic contro-
versy: malingering, 4 misdiagnosis and iatrogenesis.'5 And, part VI
concludes that a wider variety of evidence should be admissible in
DID cases because DID frequently results from severe and recurrent
childhood abuse' 6 and there is usually very little physical proof of that
abuse. In addition, there should be a rebuttable presumption of in-
sanity for every identified and confirmed criminal defendant with
DID; resulting in acquittal and mandatory treatment until recovery
occurs. This article focuses primarily on DID in the criminal context,
however, there are examples and commentary of civil cases provided
in the footnotes.
II. THE DIssOcIATIVE DisoRDERS t17
DID, originally called Multiple Personality Disorder, became an
official psychiatric diagnosis in 1980 when it was included in the Diag-
12. See infranotes 116-172 and accompanying text (for a further discussion of evidence
used in DID cases).
13. The Dissociative Disorders are a group of psychiatric conditions characterized by
disruption in consciousness, memory identity or perception. See THE SIDRAN FOUNDATION,
supra note 3, at 8; see also infra note 17.
14. See infra, notes 176-88 and accompanying text (for further discussion of malinger-
ing); see also ROBERT L. BARKER, THE SOCIAL WORK DICTIONARY 222 (1995); AMERICAN PSY-
CHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL FOR MENTAL DISORDERS 477-91 (4th
ed. 1996) (hereinafter DSM-IV].
15. However, there is no scientific research to support the idea that DID is an ia-
trogenic illness. See PsYcTRAUMA GLOSSARY, supra note 2, at 11 (for a definition of ia-
trogenesis); see also infra notes 209-20 and accompanying text (for a further discussion of
iatrogenesis).
16. SeeJOAN A. TURKUS, AN OVERVIEW OF DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT (visited July 4,
1997) <http://www.voiceofwomen.com/cen terartice.html>.
17. The Dissociative Disorders include:
Dissociative Amnesia (formerly Psychogenic Amnesia) - the sudden inability to re-
call important personal information too extensive to be explained by ordinary
forgetfulness.
Dissociative Fugue (formerly Psychogenic Fugue) - sudden unexpected travel away
from one's home or place of work, with the assumption of a new identity and
the inability to remember one's past.
Depersonalization Disorder - persistent or recurrent episodes of depersonalization
(in which the usual sense of one's own reality is lost or changed) sufficiently
severe to cause marked distress.
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nostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders (DSM-III)." 8 The gen-
eral public has become familiar with DID through biographies,
fictional books, such as Primal Fear,"9 and movies2 ° characterizing peo-
ple with multiple personalities (multiples).1
DID generally begins in childhood and is caused by severe and
repeated physical abuse, sexual abuse or both.22 Additionally, many
survivors have reported being ritually abused.2 3 As many as 98-99% of
Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) - the existence of two or more distinct personali-
ties, each of which is dominant at a given time. The dominant personality de-
termines the individual's behavior. Each personality has a consistent pattern of
perceiving the environment and self.
Dissociative Identity Disorder Not Otherwise Specified - the prominent feature is a disso-
ciative symptom, but it does not meet the criteria for any specific Dissociative
Disorder.
DSM-IV, supra note 14, at 477. Although DID is the most severe form of the five Dissocia-
tive Disorders, they all have overlapping symptoms. See Diane Swirsky & Valory Mitchell,
The Binge-Purge Cycle as a Means of Dissociation: Somatic Trauma and Somatic Defense in Sexual
Abuse and Bulimia, DISSOCIATION 18, 19 (1996); see alsoJAmEs L. SPiIA, TREATING DISSocA-
TIVE IDENTrITY DISORDER at xvii (1996); Kirkland v. Georgia, 304 S.E.2d 561, 563 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1983) (the defendant was diagnosed with Psychogenic (Dissociative) Fugue, which
the court found indistinguishable from DID for culpability purposes). Though a person
with Dissociative Fugue experiences personality differentiation on a more temporary or
sporadic basis than DID, many of the experiences and perceptions are the same. See DSM-
IV, supra note 14, at 481-83.
18. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL FOR
MENTAL DISORDERS (3d. ed. 1987). The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders
is the official manual used in the United States to classify and diagnose mental disorders.
See CHAPLIN, supra note 11, at 127. DSM I was created after WWI to provide a framework
for labeling post-war psychiatric casualties; DSM 11 was written after WAII for the same
purpose; DSM III was the first version to officially recognize Multiple Personality Disorder
(MPD); DSM IV changed the name MPD to DID and grouped it with four other Dissocia-
tive Disorders. See RALPH B. ALLISON, DUAL PERSONALITY, MULTIPLE PERSONALITY, DISSOCIA-
Tt.' IDENTITY DISORDER - WHAT'S IN A NAME? (visited September 6, 1997) <http://
www.dissociation.com/index/definition>; see also DSM-IV, supra note 14, at 477-91.
19. DIEHL, supra note 1. In the book and movie Primal Fear, an altar boy, later diag-
nosed with DID, repeatedly stabs and mutilates a Catholic Bishop. His development of
DID occurred because the Bishop forced him and other teenagers to engage in sexual acts
for the Bishop's voyeuristic gratification. Ultimately, however, Primal Fear portrays a case of
malingering as opposed to genuine DID. See also infra notes 176-88 and accompanying text
(for further discussion of malingering).
20. See Merskey, supra note 6, at 327-28, 335.
21. Multiples is a term commonly used by clinicians and individuals diagnosed with
DID.
22. See SANDRA J. HOCKING, SOMEONE I KNow HAS MULTIPLE PERSONALITIES 7 (1994).
23. Ritual abuse consists of physical, sexual and psychological abuse involving the use
of rituals. See THE SIDRAN FOUNDATION, supra note 3, at 17. "Ritual," a system of rites or
ceremonies, does not necessarily mean satanic. J.P. CHAPLIN, supra note 11, at 402; see also
THE SIDRAN FOUNDATION, supra note 3, at 17. However, most survivors state that they were
ritually abused as part of satanic worship for the purpose of indoctrinating them into sa-
tanic beliefs and practices. See THE SiDRAN FOUNDATION, supra note 3, at 17. Ritual abuse
rarely consists of a single episode. See id. It usually involves repeated abuse over an ex-
I
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people diagnosed with DID have histories of repetitive, overwhelming,
and often life-threatening trauma first occurring before the age of
nine.2 4 In fact, DID is the psychiatric disorder most strongly associ-
ated with childhood sexual abuse. 5 Children who develop DID are
highly hypnotizable.2 6  Essentially, they unconsciously hypnotize
themselves in order to escape'unbearable trauma.
27
If a child is being hurt outside the home, he or she can turn
towards parents for comfort and safety. Even if the child is
not able to voice concern (because of age or out of fear of
reprisal, confusion, or guilt), the comfort of the family can
be a place of retreat from the pain. In addition, the child
can count on parents to be vigilant of and protective from
harmful events. When the family is not a place of comfort,
however, either because of family difficulties or because the
family is the source of the abuse, then the child may have no
external resources to rely on. When a child's faith and trust
in parental safety and protection and comfort are lacking, all
that remains is to make sense of the world through what in-
ternal devices the child has developed from observing the
world around him or her.28
Each person with DID has a unique and complex internal sys-
tem. 29 The variety of personalities and the manner in which they in-
teract characterize each person's system. Every system is composed of
one host, who is in control most of the time, and at least one alternate
personality.3 0 The average DID system is composed of ten personali-
ties, but some have hundreds."1 For example, a young woman with
DID might have six personalities including a 4-year-old girl, a 90-year-
tended period of time. See id. At the present time there is tremendous controversy about
the objective reality of ritual abuse. See i. While some clinicians, researchers, and police
believe that ritual abuse occurs, others do not. See id They believe that reports of ritual
abuse are part of a mass hysteria fed by media accounts and talk show programs. See id
24. See BARRY M. COHEN ET AL., MULTIPLE PERSONALITY DISORDER FROM THE INSIDE OUT
at xx (1991).
25. See C.A. Ross et al., Dissociation and Abuse Among Multiple Personality Patients, Prosti-
tutes, and Exotic Dancers, 41 Hosp. COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 328, 328 (1990).
26. See ALLISON, supra note 18.
27. See id.
28. SP RA, supra note 17, at xxvii.
29. A DID system is composed of all of the aspects or parts of the mind. SeeTHE SIDRAN
FOUNDATION, supra note 3, at 19. This includes personality states, memories, feelings, ego
states, and entities. See id.
30. See Kanovitz et al., supra note 6, at 387; see also SPiRA, supra note 17, at xx.
31. See Merskey, supra note 6, at 328.
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old man, a secretive intellectual, a promiscuous young lady, a studious
introvert, and an impulsive, teenage girl.3 2
The initial separation of personalities (splitting)3 " is induced by a
traumatic event.3 4 Subsequently, a person with DID finds identity cre-
ation easier and new identities might be added to cope with various
types of trauma.3 5 Each alternate personality performs a defined set
of psychological tasks.6 The alters created and the tasks they are as-
signed are unique to each personality system.37 For example, a sexu-
ally abused child might find it necessary to create several identities to
cope with the psychological effects of his or her abuse.38 One identity
might be needed to house the terrifying memories, another to protect
bodily integrity, a third to discharge rage, a fourth to contain sexual
urges, a fifth to inflict self-punishment, and a sixth to be anesthetic to
pain.39
Contrary to popular stereotypes, personality changes may be sub-
tle, such as an abrupt change of mood.4" For example, a person may
be happy and enthusiastic one moment, then for no apparent reason,
suddenly become withdrawn or hostile.4" In other cases, personality
changes are more dramatic.42 For example, Annette and Ann are two
personalities residing in a 22-year-old female.43 Annette is right-
handed while Ann is left-handed. 4" The sound of their voices and
their pronunciation of words are very different.45 Annette wears her
clothing conservatively, whereas Ann loosens the same clothes to cre-
32. See George E. Atwood, The Impact of Sybil on a Patient with Multiple Personality, 38 Am.
J. Psyco.AALusis 277, 277 (1978).
33. Splitting is a defensive process in which the individual represses, dissociates, or
disconnects important feelings that have become dangerous to his or her psychic well-
being. BARKER, supra note 14, at 363.
34. See COHEN ET AL., supra note 24, at 228.
35. See Kanovitz et al., supra note 6, at 406 (citing CORNELIA B. WILBUR, THE EFFECT OF
CHILD ABUSE ON THE PSYCHE IN CHILDHOOD ANTECEDENTS OF MULTIPLE PERSONALITY DiSOR-
DER 21 (1985)).
36. See Kanovitz et al., supra note 6, at 406.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 407.
39. See id.
40. The personality observation is based on the author's personal experience working
with DID patients at the Sheppard and Enoch Pratt Hospital in Towson, Maryland.
41. See id.
42. See M.T. Orne et al., On the Differential Diagnosis of Multiple Personality in the Forensic
Context, 32 INT'L. J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 118, 120 (1984).
43. See Allen Battle, Rorschach Evaluations of Two Personalities in a Patient, 30 BarT. J.
PROJECTrIVE PSYCHOL. PERSONALITrY STUDY 11, 12 (1985).
44. See id.
45. See id.
242 JOURNAL OF HEAmTH CARE LAw & PoLIcy [VOL. 1:236
ate a seductive look.46 Annette is very reserved whereas Ann is boister-
ous.47 Annette wears her hair flat and tied in a bun whereas Ann
wears hers loose and curly.4
Alternate personalities exist to keep stressful memories and emotions
out of the host's awareness. 49 An identity switch5" frequently occurs
when the host experiences fear, anger, or sexuality.51 When the host
feels overwhelmed, the appropriate alternate automatically emerges.52
Children employ dissociative behavior5" to effectively defend
themselves against an adult aggressor.54 However, in adulthood, per-
sonality fragmentation often results in reduced behavioral control
leading to conflict with society or the criminal justice system. 55 For
instance, multiples frequently have personalities which attempt to
make life difficult for the host personality -these personalities are
known as destructive alters.56 DID crosses gender and socioeconomic
boundaries, though many multiples in treatment are well-educated
46. See id.
47. See Battle, supra note 43, at 12.
48. See id.
49. See Mark E. Hindley, United States v. Denny-Shaffer and Multiple Personality Disorder:
Who Stole the Cookie from the Cookie Jar, 1994 UTAH L. REv. 961, 964 (1994).
50. "Identity switching" is the process of changing from one personality to another.
COHEN ET AL., supra note 24, at 227-28. Switching may be stimulated by an internal percep-
tion of the need for a particular alter or by an external, environmental trigger. See id.
Individuals with DID have varying degrees of control over the process, gaining more con-
trol as treatment progresses. See id. Switches may be accompanied by physiological
changes (such as posture, facial expressions, and voice or speech patterns) and by psycho-
logical changes (such as mood, behavioral age, and level of intelligence). See id. There are
three signals that indicate a possible switch: physical manifestations, changes in demeanor
and carriage, and amnesia. See Kanovitz et al., supra note 6. Common physical manifesta-
tions include eyelid flutters, eyeball rolls, rapid blinking, twitching, startle responses, shud-
ders, and facial grimaces. See id. In addition, switches are often accompanied by subtle
changes in carriage and demeanor, such as a transition from responsible to guarded or
from age-appropriate to infantile. See id.
51. See COHEN ET AI., supra note 24, at 227-28; see also HOCKING, supra note 22, at 26-27.
52. See COHEN ET AL., supra note 24, at 227-28.
53. Dissociation is a complex process of changes in a person's consciousness that
causes a disturbance or alteration in the normally integrative functions of identity, mem-
ory, thoughts, feelings, and experiences. See COHEN ET AL., supra note 24, at 226. Dissocia-
tive processes exist on a continuum. See id At one end are mild dissociative experiences
common to most people (such as day dreaming) to the other extreme of severe, chronic
dissociation (such as in DID and the other Dissociative Disorders) which may result in an
inability to function. See id. Dissociation is normal in children and may be the only effec-
tive defense available to them against extreme anxiety caused by highly traumatic situations
and acute physical and emotional pain (most commonly sexual abuse). See id.
54. See generally Kanovitz et al., supra note 6 (discussing advantages of dissociation for
children); see also SPiRA, supra note 17, at xviii.
55. See SPIRA, supra note 17, at xvii (citingJAMEs P. BLOc:H, ASSESSMENT AND TREATMENT
OF MULTIPLE PERSONALITY DISORDER AND DiSSOCiATiVE DISORDERS 8-9 (1991)).
56. See Kanovitz et al., supra note 6, at 424-25.
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Caucasian women." Defendants with Dissociative Disorders fre-
quently behave like their mentally healthy counterparts.5" Many are
high-achievers, hold responsible jobs, and function well socially until
they begin to recover traumatic memories.
59
Integration therapy is frequently used to treat a DID patient's var-
ious personalities.' ° Individual psychotherapy facilitated by hypnosis
is the most common method of treatment.6 The average DID patient
engages in therapy twice a week and takes an antidepressant or anti-
-anxiety medication as an adjunctive treatment.6 2 Approximately 75%
of DID patients treated in this manner experience favorable out-
comes.63 Treatments that fail to address the uniqueness of the disor-
der are unsuccessful.' Unfortunately, mental health care received in
prison is frequently unsatisfactory because specialized care oriented
towards treatment of DID is virtually non-existent. 65 Because DID is
treatable,66 a rehabilitation focus as opposed to a retribution focus,
would ultimately be more beneficial.
57. See Savitz, supra note 10, at 200; see also Rubenstein, supra note 5, at 357. Interest-
ingly, most multiples in treatment are females, but most multiples accused of criminal
conduct are males. See RALPH B. ALLISON, MULTIPLE PERSONALITY AND CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR
(visited September 6, 1997) <http://www.dissociation.com/index/published/
MPD&CR.TXT>. Dr. Ralph Allison, a forensic psychiatrist who has worked extensively with
DID patients, found that the majority of the multiples he diagnosed were women. See id
However, among those he evaluated in the criminal justice system, the proportion was
almost reversed. See id
58. Based on the author's observations while working with DID patients at the Shep-
pard and Enoch Pratt Hospital in Towson, Maryland.
59. See M. Laurita Fike, Considerations and Techniques in the Treatment of Persons with Mul-
tiple Personality Disorder, 44 AM. J. OCCUPATIONAL THERAPY 999, 1004 (1990); see also United
States v. Denny-Shaffer, 2 F.3d 999, 1002 (10' Cir. 1993) (the defendant, convicted of
kidnapping an infant, was a labor and delivery nurse); In re the Marriage ofJoan C. Chat-
terton and William E. Zimkouski, 1996 Del. Fain. Ct. LEXIS 92 *1, *4 (both parties to a
divorce were diagnosed with DID; the husband was a Lab Technician for DuPont Company
and the wife was the Executive Director of a psychological and counseling services agency);
Louisiana State Bar Association v. Stevenson, 356 So.2d 408, 409 (La. 1978) (the defendant
was an attorney, ultimately convicted of credit card fraud and disbarred).
60. See Rubenstein, supra note 5, at 357; see also INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR THE STUDY
OF DISSOCIATION, GUIDELINES FOR TREATING DISSOCIATIVE IDENTITY DISORDER (MULTIPLE
PERSONALITY DISORDER) IN ADULTS (visited September 6, 1997) <http://www.issd.org/isdg-
uide.htm> [hereinafter ISSD GUIDELINES].
61. See Frank W. Putnam, & Richard J. Loewenstein, Treatment of Multiple Personality
Disorder: A Survey of Current Practices, 150 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1048, 1048 (1993).
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See Elyn R. Saks, Does Multiple Personality Disorder Exist?, 17 INT'L. J. L. & PSYCHIATRY
43, 55-56 (1994).
65. See T. Howard Stone, Therapeutic Implications of Incarceration for Persons with Severe
Mental Divorders: Searching for Rational Health Policy, 24 Am. J. CGum. L. 283, 299 (1997).
66. See NORTH ET. AL., MULTIPLE PERSONALITIES, MULTIPLE DISORDERS 66 (1993).
1998] 243
244 JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & PoucY [VOL. 1:236
III. EXPERT TESTIMONY AND EVIDENTARY ADMISSIBILITY STANDARDS
In criminal cases, experts frequently testify about the defendant's
state of mind at the time of the crime (retrospective capacity); the
defendant's capacity to perform the various mental and behavioral
tasks required in the various phases of the criminal justice process
(contemporaneous and future capacity); and the defendant's capacity
to deal with the various future environmental stressors without com-
mitting disruptive or harmful acts (prospective capacity).67
A defendant with DID raises difficult legal questions about how
evidence relating to the disorder should be assessed in the court-
room.' Should a person with Dissociative Identity Disorder be con-
sidered one person or more? Which personality should be held
responsible for the criminal act? Which will suffer the consequences?
If one personality commits a crime about which another is unaware,
how should mens rea be assessed? Similarly, how should responsibility
be assessed when one personality is aware of another's criminal act,
but is unable to intervene?
67. See Seymour L. Halleck et al., Psychiatric Diagnoses in the Legal Process, 20 BULL. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHiATRY & L. 483, 483 (1992). In civil cases, experts frequently testify about a
person's capacity to work or parent, or to perform other necessary life skills. Expert testi-
mony can establish the fitness of a person to maintain parental responsibilities. See In re
the Welfare of B.R., 1996 Wash. App. LEXIS 739 at *7 (a mother with DID, whose parental
rights were terminated, attempted to refute allegations of parental unfitness; an evaluating
clinician testified that the mother had required respite care because of fear of self harm;
that the mother found herself in a car many miles from home without knowing how she
arrived; and the mother had overwhelming urges to run or commit suicide).
68. See State v. Wheaton, 850 P.2d 507 (Wash. 1993) (finding that the Multiple Person-
ality Disorder (MPD) defense is new to the law and a thorough analysis of how medical
opinions fit relevant legal concepts was necessary but currently unavailable); see also State v.
Jones, 920 P.2d 225, 227 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996) (affirming the reasoning in Wheaton and
reiterating that again the trial court simply did not provide enough information in the
record about DID and its ramifications to make a determination about how to apply the
insanity defense to this disorder). Six dissociative disorder cases have been overturned on
appeal at least in part because of some confusion at the trial level about DID and associ-
ated legal ramifications. See United States v. Howard, 26 F.3d 134 (9th Cir. 1994) (vacated
and remanded due to confusion over admissibility of MPD diagnosis); Parker v. State, 606
S.W.2d 746 (Ark. 1980) (reversed and remanded due to confusion over admissibility of
sodium amytal interview); State v. Rodrigues, 679 P.2d 615 (Haw. 1984) (vacated and re-
manded due to confusion over whether or not the defendant's sanity was a question for the
jury where he was diagnosed with MPD); Tanner v. State, 265 A.2d 573 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1970) (remanded due to confusion over whether the issue of defendant's sanity should
have been submitted to the jury where he had been diagnosed with having a dissociated
reaction); State v. Moore, 550 A.2d 117 (N.J. 1988) (reversed and remanded due to confu-
sion over whether defendant, diagnosed with DID, committed homicide by her own con-
duct); Frederick v. State, 902 P.2d 1092 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (reversed and remanded
due to confusion over defendant's right to a competent psychiatric exam where he had
been diagnosed with possible MPD).
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DID is almost as controversial a medical diagnosis as it is a de-
fense.6 9 Opponents either (1) do not believe that the disorder exists,
(2) do not believe that the defendant has the disorder, or (3) do not
believe that a defendant with the disorder should have reducid crimi-
nal responsibility.7 ° Nonetheless, DID's inclusion in DSM-IV indicates
general scientific acceptance.7 ' Additionally, the majority of scientific
literature accepts the existence of DID.72 Many courts have recog-
nized DID as an abuse excuse, and legal treatment has varied
greatly." Because DID is becoming increasingly common in legal
contexts, the legal community should carefully consider evidentiary
questions.
Determining whether a DID defendant committed the criminal
act in question, can be resolved using traditional rules of evidence and
burden allocation. The second task, determining whether a DID de-
fendant who committed a crime is criminally culpable, is more com-
plex. Diagnosing DID is only the first step toward evaluating
culpability. A more in depth assessment might involve: (1) identifying
the personality or personalities involved in the criminal activity (2)
assessing each personality's ability to exert control over the defend-
ant's overall behavior and (3) evaluating each personality's capacity to
appreciate the wrongfulness of the conduct at issue. Courts are con-
69. See generally Eugene L. Bliss, Professional Skepticism about Multiple Personality, 176
J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 533-34 (1988); see also Phillip M. Coons, Confirmation of
Childhood Abuse in Child and Adolescent Cases of Multiple Personality Disorder and Dissociative
Disorder Not Otherwise Specified, 182J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 461, 461 (1994).
70. See Ralph B. Allison, The Multiple Personality Defendant in Court, 3 AM. J. FORENSIC
PSyCmiATRY 181, 182 (1983). Perhaps partially as a result of skepticism about the disorder,
acquittals are rare. See Merskey, supra note 6, at 336. There is only one on record. See id.
In 1978, Billy Milligan, the campus rapist, was acquitted on charges of rape based on his
claim of DID (MPD). See id. Although Milligan was not incarcerated, he spent twelve years
in various mental institutions before being released. See Nancy McVicar, A Tale of a Man's
Many Minds, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale), February 16, 1995, at IE. A second DID
defendant, Rodrigo Rodrigues, initially received an acquittal based on his DID defense, but
the ruling was reversed and he was convicted. See Rodrigues, 679 P.2d at 617. He was
charged with first-degree rape and sodomy after he lured young girls into secluded areas
and sexually assaulted them. See id. He was acquitted because he was diagnosed with DID.
See id. at 620. Subsequently, the Hawaii Supreme Court held that an insanity defense based
on DID did not per se require a finding of acquittal and that the lower court had erred in
not allowing ajury to determine the defendant's sanity. See id. at 617. The court reasoned
that, [w]hat psychiatrists may consider a mental disease or defect for medical purposes
where clinical treatment is the main concern may not be the same as mental disease or
defect for the jury's purpose where an accused's criminal responsibility is at issue. See id. at
620 (quoting State v. Nuetzal, 606 P.2d 920, 928 (Haw. 1980)).
71. See Saks, supra note 64, at 76; see also supra note 18 and accompanying text.
72. See Saks, supra note 64, at 77.
73. See AMERCAN BAR AssocATiON, Can Psychiatrists Give Reliable Testimony in Criminal
Trials?, 83 ABAJ. 77, 77 (1997).
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cerned not only about a legitimate DID diagnosis, but with the func-
tional limitations resulting from medical and psychological
disorders."4 Consequently, expert witnesses must testify whether a
person has DID and, if so, what effect the disorder had on their
psyche at the time of the criminal conduct.75
Obviously, evidence, no matter how convincing, is of little use if
inadmissible. Daubert 6 and Frye77 have set the standard for admissibil-
ity of scientific evidence in both criminal and civil cases. In 1993, the
Supreme Court broadened the federal admissibility standard in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals78 when it held that the Federal
Rules of Evidence should be used for admitting scientific testimony in
federal trials.79 Daubert provides that, if scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist a trier of fact to understand the evi-
dence or to determine a fact or issue, an expert may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise."0 UnderFrye, evidence had to be
generally accepted in the scientific community before it was consid-
ered admissible.8 ' General acceptance is still relevant to evidentiary
decision making, but it is now just one of the four Daubert prongs.8 2
The additional three are testing, peer review, and known rate of
error.83
States use Daubert, Fye, or a hybrid of the two to determine admis-
sibility. Because Daubert is not as restrictive as the former Frye stan-
dard, DID defendants may benefit from an increased range of
admissible forensic evidence. 4 Although evidence still must be rele-
vant and reliable, general scientific acceptance is not absolutely neces-
sary. Some diagnostic methodologies, such as hypnotic and sodium
amytal induced interviews, are still not generally accepted in the scien-
tific community because they are controversial, and thus, may not be
admissible, even in a Daubertjurisdiction. 5 In jurisdictions still follow-
ing Frye, it may be much easier to argue that controversial DID evalua-
74. See generally Halleck, supra note 67.
75. See id at 490.
76. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
77. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (1923).
78. 509 U.S. at 591; see generallyJoseph T. Walsh, The Evolving Standards of Admissibility of
Scientific Evidence, 36 JutrEs' J. 33, 33-36 (1997) (commenting on Daubert's effect on the
judiciary).
79. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
80. Id. at 588 (quoting FED. R EVID. 702).
81. Id. at 586 (quoting Fye, 293 F. at 1014).
82. Id. at 594.
83. See id. at 593-94.
84. See Richard C. Reuben, Completing the Admissibility Equation, A.B.A.J. 44, 44 (1997).
85. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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tion methods should not be admissible because they are not generally
accepted in the scientific community.
IV. EVIDENTIARY BASES FOR DIAGNOSING DID
Some of the common types of evidence introduced to establish a
defendant's diagnosis of DID create admissibility problems. Common
types of evidence include (1) clinical interviews, (2) psychological test-
ing, (3) psychotherapy, (4) physiological testing, (5) social service,
medical and school records, (6) and family interviews. Polygraphy,
artwork interpretation and writing analysis are less frequently used.
A. Clinical Interviews
Clinical interviews can consist of an informal dialogue or they can
be highly structured. In either case, the person being evaluated is
questioned about various occurrences including amnesia,"6 fugue
states,8 7 derealization,"8 depersonalization, 89 age regression, 90 and au-
tohypnosis.f DID defendants are also asked about childhood trauma
because Dissociative Disorders most frequently result from child
abuse.92
A number of standardized diagnostic interview protocols exist for
assessing dissociation.9" The Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV
Dissociative Disorders (SCID-D) was the first diagnostic instrument
developed to comprehensively evaluate dissociative symptoms and dis-
86. Amnesia is characterized by the inability to recall some or all past experience as.a
result of trauma or organic factors, or combinations of both. See BARKER, supra note 14, at
19.
87. A fugue state is a psychogenic condition in which individuals, usually after exper-
iencing intolerable internal or external stress, develop amnesia and abandon their homes,
jobs, or familiar environments. Id. at 143.
88. Derealization is a dissociative symptom in which one experiences the external
world as strange or unreal. Id. at 97-98. Individuals may see others as being unfamiliar or
robot-like and perceive alterations in the size or shape of viewed objects. I.
89. Depersonalization is a feeling of being in an unreal situation or a sense that one's
self or body is detached from the immediate environment. Id. at 97. This experience is
often found in individuals who are subjected to inordinate stress or are in crisis. Id.
90. Behaviors and thought patterns that indicate a return to earlier or more-primitive
levels of development characterize age regression. Id at 319. This phenomenon is often
seen in people who are exposed to severe stress, trauma, or unresolved conflicts. rd
91. Autohypnosis is a spontaneous or purposeful hypnotic trance state produced by a
person within his or her own psyche. THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR THE STUDY OF DISSO-
CIATION, GUIDELINES FOR TREATING DISSOCIATIVE IDENTITY DISORDER IN ADULTS 11 (1994).
These states may include any or all of the full range of hypnotic phenomena, such as
sensory alterations, anesthesia, time distortion, relaxation, age regression, and alterations
in physiological functioning. See id.; see also TuRKus, supra note 16, at 2.
92. See TURKUS, supra note 16, at 3.
93. See generally NORTH ET. AL., supra note 66, at 100-05.
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orders.94 The SCID-D allows a trained interviewer to assess the sever-
ity of five dissociative symptoms: amnesia, depersonalization,
derealization, identity confusion, and identity alteration. 5 The Disso-
ciative Experiences Scale (DES) is the most commonly used instru-
ment for assessing dissociative experiences.96 It is a 28-item self-report
inventory that can be completed in about ten minutes.97 It asks the
respondent to indicate the frequency with which certain dissociative
experiences occur.98 Another common test is the Dissociative Disor-
ders Interview Schedule (DDIS); a 35-40 minute structured interview
developed for both clinical and research purposes.99
Although controversial, diagnostic interviews can be induced by
hypnosis or sodium amytal.' ° Hypnosis can aid in diagnosis through
the identification and elicitation of alternate personalities.0 1 It may
also help a person to recall traumatic memories and facilitate commu-
nication between alternate personalities. 0 2 Frequently it is difficult to
confirm the existence of a disorder as complex as DID in a single
interview or short time frame.'03 Multiple interviews and repeated ob-
servations are often required. Hypnosis is particularly useful because
it helps DID patients return to a state similar to the one in which they
registered a particular memory, making recall easier." 4 Multiples
lack conscious recall of their traumatic experiences because they were
in a dissociative state when the memories were stored.' 0 5 If evaluation
time is restricted, some clinicians feel that hypnosis and sodium
amytal are very useful, and sometimes even necessary in DID cases.' 0 6
94. See PS'cT AumA GLOSSARY, supra note 2, at 19.
95. See id.
96. See Becky E. Katz & David H. Gleaves, Dissociative Symptoms Among Patients With Eat-
ing Disorders: Associated Feature or Artifact of a Comorbid Dissociative Disorder, DISSOCIATION 28,
29 (1996).
97. See THE SimRAN FOUNDATION, supra note 3, at 8.
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. See ISSD GUIDELINES, supra note 60.
101. See Fike, supra note 59, at 1000.
102. See id. Hypnosis is also widely used in DID therapy. See id; see also Kanovitz et a].,
supra note 6, at 439.
103. See Fike, supra note 59, at 1002.
104. See Kanovitz et al., supra note 6, at 439.
105. See id.
106. See EUGENE L. BLISS, MULTIPLE PERSONALITY, ALLIED DISORDERS, AND HYPNOSIS 118
(1986).
The very obvious cases, in which personalities are on parade, are uncommon, but
more subtle examples are frequent. If one wishes to see bacteria, one needs a
light microscope; if one wishes to see a virus, one needs an electron microscope;
if one wishes to encounter subtle cases of multiple personalities, one needs to use
hypnosis.
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However, in some jurisdictions, hypnotic and sodium amytal in-
terviews are inadmissible."0 7 For example, in Alley v. Tennessee, the de-
fendant's contention on appeal that the trial judge erred by refusing
to allow the jury to view videotapes of his hypnotic and sodium amytal
sessions was rejected.' 0" One opposition to hypnosis and sodium
amytal is that they may not be considered generally accepted in the
scientific community.'0 9 For example, in Khatain v. Jones, Dr. Wayne
Jones conducted a sodium amytal interview with a DID patient who
disclosed that she had been sexually abused by her father as a child
and that her mother was aware of the abuse. 1 0 Although Dr. Jones
had conducted a sodium amytal interview with his patient and dis-
closed its results to her family, he stated in his testimony that sodium
amytal interviews could not be relied upon."1
Another opposition to hypnosis and sodium amytal is the possibil-
ity that they can enhance a person's ability to be influenced." 2 In
United States v. Swanson, the defense contention that a mail conspiracy
and extortion scheme was a prank was undercut by a taped sodium
amytal interview of a defendant diagnosed with a dissociated state."'
It appeared on tape that the interviewing clinician may have suggested
to the defendant that the crime was a prank. 1 4 Thus, the prosecution
contended that the defendant had been unduly influenced.
In order to increase the probability that hypnotic evidence will be
admissible, all forensic hypnotic sessions should be conducted in con-
formance with guidelines promulgated by the American Medical Asso-
ciation Council on Scientific Affairs which requires, among other
practices, awareness of the possibility of interviewee deception, inter-
viewer training in the forensic use of hypnosis, avoidance of suggestive
questioning techniques, and videotaping. 5
Id
107. See Savitz, supra note 10, at 201.
108. 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 428 *1, *51.
109. See Marlene Steinberg et al., Multiple Personality Disorder in riminal Law, 21 BULL.
AM.'AcAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. No. 3 at 345, 353 (1993).
110. 1993 WL 240049 *1, *1-2 (Tex. Crim. App.) (Dr. Jones held a family conference
and informed the patient's husband and daughters about the abuse and disclosed the
identities of the abusers; subsequently, the patient's parents sued the doctor for defama-
tion and negligent infliction of emotional distress).
I111. See id. at *3.
112. See Stanley Abrams, The Multiple Personality: A Legal Defense, 25 AM. J. CuNICAL HYP-
NOSIs 225, 225 (1983); see also ISSD GUIDELINES, supra note 60.
113. 572 F.2d 523, 526 (5' Cir. 1978).
114. See id.
115. See AMERICAN MEDICAL ASs'N COUNCIL ON SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS, Scientific Status of Re-
feshing Recollection by the Use of Hypnosis, 253J. AM. MED. ASs'N 1918, 1923 (1985).
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B. Psychological Testing
The medical community uses various psychological tests to evalu-
ate DID patients and their alternate personalities." 6  Psychological
tests frequently used with multiples are the Wechsler Adult Intelli-
gence Scale,"' the Bender-Gestault,"' the Rorschach"1 9 and the Min-
nesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI). 2 1 The results of
these standardized tests often differ as much for each defendant's per-
sonality, as they do for separate defendants. t2 For example, alternate
personalities tend to respond differently when taking the Rorschach
Test, particularly in their movement and color perception. 122 In one
study, a patient's more passive personality described seeing persons
sitting at a table, whereas a more aggressive personality saw something
carrying or dragging them off.'2 3 The same patient's more passive
116. See ORNE, supra note 42, at 120; see also Saks, supra note 64, at 57-61. In a civil
context, psychological tests can be given to determine the extent of mental disability for
employment disability benefit determination. See Mangold v. Chater, 1995 WL 580099 *1
(D. Kan) (Ted Mangold applied for disability benefits alleging a variety of disabilities,
among which was a potential diagnosis of DID; he was given two psychiatric tests which
showed that he suffered from severe depression and suicidal thoughts to the point of se-
verely impairing his employment potential thus entitling him to disability benefits).
117. The Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) is an individual general intelligence
test which yields verbal and performance IQ's as well as a total IQ. See CHAPLIN, supra note
11, at 493. The test is also believed to have diagnostic significance for certain psychiatric
problems. See id.
118. The Bender-Gestault is a test consisting of nine designs that the individual is asked
to copy. See id. at 54. Analyses of the spatial errors are held to be significant for diagnosing
psychological disorders. See id.
119. The Rorschach Test is a projective technique in which the subject is shown 10
plates or cards containing bisymetrical inkblots. See id. at 404. Five of the blots are in black
and white with various shaded areas; 2 contain black, white, and colors in varying amounts;
3 are in various colors. See id. The cards are presented to the subject in a prescribed
sequence and he is asked: what does it look like? What could this be? See id. Responses
are categorized and evaluated according to such factors as the amount of movement seen,
the content of the blot, color responses, shading, form, and originality or popularity. See
id. Responses to color are indicative of the individual's impulsive and emotional life. See
i. Form and location are important indices of the individual's overall apperception or
approach to his world; movement is indicative of introversion; original responses are indic-
ative of intelligence, although bizarre responses may be indicators of mental disturbance.
See id. A number of ratios are also calculated and evaluated in scoring the Rorschach, and
the final evaluation is a diagnostic of the personality as a whole. See id.; see also Fike, supra
note 59, at 1002.
120. The MMPI is "a personality inventory containing over 500 statements with which
the subject indicates agreement or disagreement." CHAPLIN, supra note 11, at 283-84. -Pat-
terns and responses are scored for the individual's tendencies toward various conditions
such as schizophrenia, hysteria or depression. See id.
121. See id.
122. See Irwin M. Perr, Crien and Multiple Personality Disorder, 21 Am. AcAD. PSYCHIArRY &
L. 70, 70 (1991).
123. See id.
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personality saw forms such as flowers and leaves whereas the more
aggressive personality saw blood and the inner organs of someone.
12 4
In a 1990 study, DID patients demonstrated partial or alternating
responses on IQ tests indicative of different cognitive levels.' 25  For
example, a DID subject initially received an IQ score of 115.126 On
the retest, her IQ rose to 129, a change that is outside normal retest
parameters. 127 Similarly, in New Jersey v. Moore, the defendant, Marie
Moore was accused of capital murder and diagnosed with DID.' 21 An
examining physician conducted intelligence quotient, personality and
neuro-psychological tests on Ms. Moore's host personality, Marie, as
well as on an alternate personality, Billy.' 29 Marie's test results dif-
fered significantly from Billy's.' 30 These test results and observations
were partial bases for the examining physician's DID diagnosis of the
defendant.13
1
C. Psychotherapy
A defendant may attempt to enter into evidence a preexisting di-
agnosis of DID or another Dissociative Disorder. 3 2 A pre-existing di-
agnosis prior to litigation may counter, for example, accusations of
124. See id.
125. SeeJudith G. Armstrong, & RichardJ. Lowenstein, Characteristics of Patients with Mul-
tiple Personality and Dissociative Disorders on Psychological Testing, 178 J. NERVOUS & MENrAL
DisoDEts 448, 451 (1990).
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. 550 A.2d 117, 130 (N.J. 1988).
129. See id. at 140.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. In civil cases, psychotherapy can play an important role in recovered memory cases.
See, e.g., Gregory G. Gordan, Adult Survivors of Childhood Sexual Abuse and the Statute of Limita-
tions: The Need for Consistent Application of the Delayed Discovery Rule, 20 PEPP. L. REv. 1359,
1367 (1993) (discussing therapist awareness of patient repression in sexual abuse cases).
When an adult victim attempts to bring a tort suit against a childhood abuser, the statute of
limitations has often passed. See Jacqueline Kanovitz, Hypnotic Memories and Civil Sexual
Abuse Trials, 45 VAND. L. REv. 1185, 1198 (1992). The treating therapist can testify about
whether the patient has genuinely recovered repressed or dissociated memories. See, e.g.,
id. (commenting on psychotherapist awareness of patient's traumatic memory retrieval).
The therapist's testimony is valuable in aiding the judiciary to determine whether to toll
the statute of limitations. See id. Alternatively, the absence of such testimony can be damag-
ing. SeeJohnson v. Johnson, 766 F. Supp. 662, 662-63 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (Deborah Johnson
brought suit in the state of Illinois against her parents claiming that her father sexually
abused her between 1955 and 1968 and that her mother was aware of the abuse but failed
to protect her; the personal injury statute of limitations was two years, but Deborah
claimed that she did not become aware of the abuse until beginning psychotherapy in
1987).
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malingering.' 33 Although all fifty states have enacted some form of
the psychotherapist-patient privilege, the patient has the right to waive
that privilege and allow the testimony. 1' For example, Robin Grims-
ley was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol and
claimed insanity based on a preexisting DID diagnosis.1 i 5 To bolster
her defense, she provided information about her five years in psycho-
therapy and her recent work on integrating' 36 her personalities.
37
The Ohio Court of Appeals held that whether Robin -or 'Jennifer,"
her alternate personality- was in control at the time, Ms. Grimsley
was "conscious and her actions were a product of her own volition."'3 8
Even if a person does not have a preexisting diagnosis of DID,
they may have a history of other mental disorders. People with DID
on the average spend almost seven years in the mental health system
before they are correctly diagnosed." 9 Of course, the lack of a docu-
mented history of mental illness does not confirm a lack of mental
illness. It may just signify that the person did not have the finances or
desire to seek medical treatment.
D. Physiological Testing
Medical observations confirm dramatic differences in physical
manifestations of alternate personalities.1 40 Alternate personalities
can require different eyeglass prescriptions, speak different languages,
work with different hands, respond differently to physical tests such as
electroencephalograms 41 and galvanic skin response tests, 142 and
may respond differently to the same type of medication. 43  Some
have headaches or allergies that are specific to only certain personali-
ties.' 4 4 Physical results can be convincing indicators.' 45 Therefore, if
133. See infra notes 176-88 and accompanying text (for further discussion of
malingering).
134. SeeJaffee v. Redmond, 116 S.Ct. 1923, 1924 (1996).
135. See Grimsey, 444 N.E.2d at 1073; see also supra note 5.
136. Integration is a unification or fusion of personalities that a person can maintain on
a long-term or permanent basis. See COHEN ET AL., supra note 24, at 227.
137. See Grimsley, 444 N.E.2d at 1075.
138. Id.
139. SeeJames A. Chu, On the Misdiagnosis of Multiple Personality Disorder IV(4) DissociA.
-noN 200, 200 (1991).
140. See United States v. Denny-Shaffer, 2 F.3d 999, 1008 (10h Cir. 1993) (citing Saks,
supra note 6, at 44-45).
141. An "electroencephalogram" is a graphic record of the electrical currents developed
by a sensitive galvanometer. J.P. CHAPLIN, supra note 11, at 150.
142. A "galvanic skin response" is a change in the electrical resistance of the skin as
detected by a sensitive galvanometer. Id. at 189.
143. See id.
144. See NORTH ET. A., supra note 66, at 59-60.
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wide variations are found in physical test results, a DID diagnosis may
be supported. 1
46
E. Social Service, Medical, and Academic Records
Social service, medical, and academic records may provide docu-
mentation of abuse or dissociative behaviors 47 and may identify caus-
ative indicators. 4 The probability that a person who was abused as a
child will develop a mental disorder is higher than for a person with a
functional family background.149 However, a documented history of
abuse is not a per se indication that a person has DID, or any mental
disorder for that matter.
F Family Interviews
Interviews with family members, friends, and significant others
can provide insight into behavior consistent with the existence of al-
ternate personalities such as amnesiac episodes and dramatic behav-
ioral changes. 5 ° Although bias may exist with familial testimony, such
testimony is often used by the defense because, among other things,
family members can provide information about their own psychiatric
145. See Terry Jane Field, The Polygraph Paradox: florida's Conflicting Approaches Toward the
Admissibility and Use of Polygraph Results, 20 NOVA L. REv. 1369, 1386 (1996) (people who
have been known to "beat the polygraph" may not necessarily "beat the
electroencephalogram").
146. See Saks, supra note 64, at 57, 65-70. In civil cases, physical exams can be used to aid
in determining whether a child has been subject to abuse and whether they suffer from a
Dissociative Disorder. See McClelland v. McCleland, 595 N.E.2d 1131, 1133 (Ill. App. Ct.
1992) (after incomplete physical and psychological evaluations of a child involved in a
custody battle, various doctors came to different conclusions about whether the child's
father committed sexual abuse and whether the child had DID).
147. See Allison, supra note 70, at 189. Plaintiff, Raymond Andrews, diagnosed with
"mixed personality disorder," Dysthymia, substance abuse, alcoholism, and Adjustment Dis-
order, applied for Supplemental Security Income Benefits based on his various conditions.
Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1037 (9' Cir. 1995). Andrews' medical records were
reviewed to determine the effect of the conditions on his ability to work. See id. at 1038.
The evaluators determined that although Andrew had various psychiatric diagnoses, he was
no more than moderately limited in his ability to work and consequently, his request for
benefits was denied. See id.
148. See New Jersey v. L.K., 582 A.2d 297, 298 (NJ. 1990) (a juvenile DID defendant's
medical and psychiatric records were introduced as evidence because they contained infor-
mation about severe physical and sexual abuse of the defendant by her father beginning
when she was five years old); see also Arizona ex rel. Romley v. Arizona, 836 P.2d 445, 445
(Az. CL App. 1992) (defendant, charged with stabbing her husband, claimed self defense;
she requested her husband's medical records be admitted into evidence to prove he suf-
fered from DID and, at the time of the stabbing, was manifesting one of his violent
personalities).
149. See NORTH ET AL., supra note 66, at 58-59.
150. See Savitz, supra note 10, at 200.
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histories. 5 ' DID frequently results from dysfunctional family relation-
ships. 52 If a parent or other caretaker has a history of mental illness,
the existence of dysfunctional family relationships should be investi-
gated. For example, in State v. Adcock, the defendant suffered from
multiple personality disorder, and his father testified that the defend-
ant suffered from depression and that the family had a history of
mental illness.'
53
When there is no documentation of abuse, family members are
often the only ones who can confirm or deny its occurrence. A disad-
vantage is that if the family member being interviewed was the abuser,
it may be unlikely that they would subject themselves to criminal pen-
alty and ostracism by acknowledging the abuse. Likewise, a person
having a close relationship with the abuser may not reveal the abuse
out of loyalty or fear.
G. Polygraph Examinations
Appellate records of cases involving DID defendants do not re-
veal widespread use of polygraph examinations (polygraphy).' 5 4 In
the past, polygraph results have frequently been inadmissible in many
jurisdictions,' 55 however, as of 1993, the year Daubert was decided, at-
torneys have more frequently sought to introduce them.' 56 Most fed-
eral courts questioning the use of polygraph results under Daubert
have admitted the results into evidence.' 57
Polygraph results could be used to support or deny the veracity of
DID symptoms. For example, a person with DID may respond differ-
ently to questions asked while in various personality states. In that
respect, polygraph results could potentially be part of a useful defense
if admissible. On the other hand polygraph examinations can be
manipulated by knowledgeable DID defendants. 5 ' Likewise, some
studies have shown that polygraph examinations are not particularly
reliable."t 9
151. See Ulrich v. Senior and Disabled Services Division, 921 P.2d 982 (Or. App. 1996)
(Plaintiff's husband's reports about the extent of her disability and his assistance to her
were necessary because she claimed that he was her caretaker).
152. See HOCVKNG, supra note 22, at 7-8.
153. 310 S.E.2d 587, 587 (N.C. 1984).
154. See Owens supra, note 4, at 140-43.
155. See Richard C. Reuben, Moment of Truth, 83 ABAJ. 38, 38 (1997).
156. See Thomas E. Zehnle, Polygraph Admissibility in the Post-Daubert Era, 12 CRiM. JusT.
11, 11 (1997).
157. See Reuben, supra note 155, at 38.
158. See David C. Raskin, Hofmann, Hypnosis and the Polygraph, 3-NOV Utah BJ. 7, 9
(1990).
159. See Zehnle, supra note 156, at 13.
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H. Artwork Interpretation and Writing Analysis
Artwork interpretation and writing analysis -respectively known
as art therapy and journaling- are used predominantly in psycho-
therapy and in-patient treatment programs." ° These techniques are
rarely used legally because their evaluation is highly subjective. 16'
However, as the use of these clinical evaluation skills increases, they
should become more consistent, and courts may be more prone to
admit such evidence in the future.
Art therapy is frequently used with multiples as a psychoanalytic
vehicle of self-discovery. 162 It can increase their awareness of sub-
merged conflict. 6 Expression through art can offer multiples relief
from pain that they can not voice."6 Drawing assignments can indi-
cate problems of fracturing, depersonalization, abuse and
multiplicity.' 65
Journaling involves writing on a regular basis to access inner feel-
ings and expose conflicts, 166 and can reveal different signatures and
handwriting styles.' 67 It can take a relatively unstructured form, such
as writing in a diary or creating poetry, or it can take a more struc-
tured form, such as completing sentences or drafting topical
paragraphs."6 Multiples use journaling to discover and identify alter-
nate personalities as well as to uncover childhood conflicts. 169 They
can use journals to recover "lost time" ' ° and to recall lost exper-
160. Therapists use journaling with more than half of all DID patients; art therapy is
used frequently, as well. See Gail Zehner-Richert & Christy Bergland, Treatment Choices:
Rehabilitation Services Used by Patients With Multiple Personality Disorder, 46 AM. J. OCCUPA-
TIONAL THERAPY 634, 635 (1992).
161. See Emily E. Smith-Lee, Recovered Memories of Childhood Abuse: Should Long-Buried
Memories Be Admissible Testimony?, B.C. L. REv. 591, 606 (1996).
162. See Becky Frye, Art and Multiple Personality Disorder: An Expressive Framework for Occu-
pational Therapy, 44 AM. J. OCCUPATIONAL THERAPY 1013, 1013 (1990). ("Psychoanalytic
vehicle of self-discovery" is a phrase created by Frye.)
163. See id. ("Submerged conflict" is a phrase created by Frye.)
164. See id.
165. See generally id.
166. See KATHLEEN ADAMs, THE WAY OF THE JOURNAL at vii (1993).
167. See Lewis & Bard, supra note 4, at 748; see alsoJohnson v. Johnson, 766 F.Supp. 662,
662-63 (N.D. III. 1991) (plaintiff brought suit against parents alleging child abuse; two
handwritten letters exhibiting plaintiff's various personalities were submitted as evidence
of plaintiff's DID).
168. See id. at vii-viii.
169. See HOCKING, supra note 22, at 42-43.
170. COHEN Er AL., supra note 24, at 227. Losing time involves having no recollection of
what one did during a given period and may involve hours, days or even years. See id
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iences.171 The contents of journals can be -but are rarely- used in
litigation.1
7 2
V. CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING A DID DIAGNOSIS
Although included in the DSM-IV, DID remains a controversial
diagnosis.1 73 One reason that DID is so controversial is that some cli-
nicians doubt its existence, despite the fact that it is now included in
the DSM-IV.17 Other clinicians feel that, even if it does exist, it is
relatively easy for a person to simulate the disorder, and is highly ma-
nipulable. 175 Therefore, it is difficult to defend a DID case without
discussing three persistent concerns. These concerns are malinger-
ing, misdiagnosis and iatrogenesis.
A. Malingering
Malingering is the "intentional production of false or grossly ex-
aggerated physical or psychological symptoms, motivated by external
incentives such as avoiding military duty, avoiding work, obtaining fi-
nancial compensation, evading criminal prosecution, or obtaining
drugs."' 76 For example, malingering could occur in a criminal con-
text if a defendant felt that she could avoid prosecution by simulating
a mental illness. Likewise, malingering could also occur in a civil con-
text if a person wanted to obtain public benefits instead of working.
When a defendant alleges that he or she has DID, prosecution
experts frequently make accusations of malingering due to a criminal
defendant's increased motive to fabricate a mental disorder. 77 De-
171. See Adams, supra note 166, at 73.
172. See Rutherford v. Rutherford, 401 S.E.2d 177, 179 (S.C. Ct. App. 1990) (the appel-
late court considered the fact that the defendant's journal did not contain any information
about an alleged affair of one of her other personalities to reverse the lower court deci-
sion); see also supra note 7 and accompanying text.
173. See George Serban, Multiple Personality: An Issue for Forensic Psychiatry, 46 AM. J. PSy-
CHO-nHERAP 269, 269-71 (1992); see also Saks, supra note 64, at 45-46.
174. See Merskey, supra note 6, at 334-39.
175. See Lewis & Bard, supra note 4, at 751; see also Stephen H. Dinwiddie et al., Multiple
Personality Disorder: Scientific and Medicolegal Issues, 21 BULL. Am. ACAD. PSYCMATRY & L. 69,
74-75 (1993); State v. Wheaton, 850 P.2d 507, 508 (Wash. 1993); Saks, supra note 64, at 47-
50; see also supra note 68 and accompanying text.
176. DSM-IV, supra note 14, at 683.
177. See Savitz, supra note 10, at 200. Often, mental health specialists disagree as to the
veracity of a DID defense. See Lowery v. Young, 972 F.2d 351, 351 (7" Cir. 1992) (evalu-
ators were adamantly divided about whether a criminal defendant had DID or was malin-
gering); see also Alley v. Tennessee, 1997 Tenn. Grim. App. LEXIS 428 at *3 (the defendant
was evaluated by a mental health team for four months who determined and testified that
Alley was malingering based on a variety of indicators including the fact that he acted
normal around other patients and only acted dissociatively in the presence of medical
[VOL. 1:236
DIAGNOSTIC EVIDENCE ADMISSIBILITY
spite fear that defendants somehow fake DID, it is one of the most
difficult mental disorders to feign.17 Though a skilled actor could
simulate various psyches and even some physical symptoms, they are
generally unable to maintain a consistent simulation over a period of
time.' 7 9 In addition, some physical symptoms, such as neurological
patterns, are extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible, to control.
Malingering [DID] would seem to require a great deal of act-
ing talent. One needs to portray a range of personality styles
- each with its own characteristic affective tone, style of think-
ing and viewing the world, likes and dislikes - consistently
over time, without confusion of one personality with an-
other. In essence, one needs all the skills of a good actor,
indeed, a good actor portraying several characters in the
same play.1 °
In one study comparing true multiple defendants with malinger-
ers, none of the malingerers were able to maintain consistency in an
assumed personality's voice, movement characteristics, and mem-
ory.1 8" The researchers noticed distinctive characteristics in malinger-
ers that were different than in true multiples.'" 2 For example, true
multiples are much more likely to have long histories of prior unsuc-
cessful medical treatment or therapy.'"3 Malingerers tended to focus
much more on their legal troubles during interviews." 4 Malingerers
usually reported only one or two alternate personalities whereas genu-
ine multiples tended to report more.'8 5 Malingerers tended to over-
dramatize their symptoms whereas true multiples tried to hide theirs
out of embarrassment or denial." 6 For example,
A patient charged with shoplifting was hospitalized on a unit
with three DID patients. She rapidly claimed she suffered
from DID and must have stolen while in another personality.
She had an extensive public history of discrepant disremem-
bered behaviors, and many people were ready to attest to her
being like two different people. Her personalities were po-
evaluators; however, a noted DID expert, Dr. Allen Battle, conducted hypnotic interviews
of the defendant and testified that the defendant had DID).
178. See ORNE, supra note 42, at 120.
179. See id.
180. Saks, supra note 64, at 55.
181. See Richard P. Kluft, The Simulation and Dissimulation of Multiple Personality Disorder
30 AM. J. CLINICAL HYPNOSIS 104, 109-12 (1987).
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. See id.
185. See id.
186. See Kluft, supra note 181, at 109-12.
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larized, extreme, and quite convincing when forensic mat-
ters were under discussion. She had no history or signs and
symptoms to suggest DID other than the presence of the sec-
ond personality. Several times a day she engaged in dra-
matic DID behaviors, ensured that they received attention,
and claimed amnesia for them. Interviewed at length, it be-
came clear that the second personality could not maintain
consistency unless focused on the alleged offense.1 87
Because a criminal defendant has a motive to malinger in the
hopes of avoiding prosecution, any evidence of malingering must be
critically evaluated.' 88 Consequently, it is important to evaluate behav-
ioral indicators such as overdramatization of personality changes and
an extreme focus on legal ramifications. Though not definitive, be-
cause some personality changes are in fact dramatic, any such indica-
tors should be identified and critically evaluated.
B. Misdiagnosis
Misdiagnosis can easily occur because of the wide variety of
mental disorders and their overlapping symptoms. Multiples are mis-
diagnosed on the average for almost seven years before they receive
an accurate diagnosis.'" 9 During that time they receive an average of
almost four erroneous diagnoses. 90 DID is frequently misdiagnosed
for a variety of reasons such as diagnostic opposition, diagnostic pre-
disposition, or time exigency. 9' Some experts allege that.DID is
underdiagnosed. '92
Like child abuse, particularly incest, there is a professional
reluctance to diagnose Multiple Personality Disorder. In all
likelihood this reluctance stems from a number of factors in-
cluding the generally subtle presentation of the symptoms,
the fearful reluctance of the patient to divulge important
clinical information, professional ignorance concerning dis-
sociative disorders, and the reluctance of the clinician to be-
lieve that incest actually occurs and is not the product of
fantasy. Individuals may go through prolonged periods with-
187. Id. at 112-13.
188. See ORNE, note 42, at 120-21 (discussing the possibility of malingering in DID crimi-
nal cases as illustrated by Kenneth Bianchi, the hillside strangler); see also Dinwiddie et al.,
supra note 175, at 74.
189. Frye, supra note 162, at 1016.
190. See id. at 1017.
191. See Eve Bernstein Carlson et al., Validity of the Dissociative Experiences Scale in Screening
for Multiple Personality Disorder: A Multicenter Study, 150 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 1030, 1030 (1993);
see also Hindley, supra note 49, at 966.
192. See Kanovitz et al., supra note 6.
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out dissociation, accordingly the diagnosis is missed because
a window of diagnosibility did not exist at the time of the
clinical examination.'
93
Another reason why DID may be underdiagnosed is that it shares
symptoms with some other disorders. 94 As mentioned above, people
with DID are often misdiagnosed for several years before they receive
an accurate diagnosis.' 95 For example, dramatic changes of mood or
demeanor are characteristic of individuals with DID but also of people
with manic-depressive illness.' 6 Likewise, symptoms associated with
schizophrenia, such as hearing voices, are also characteristic of
DID. 97 Most mental health professionals simply do not have experi-
ence diagnosing DID, and consequently they are more likely to make
a false negative diagnosis.1t s Additionally, people being evaluated may
not be forthcoming about their symptoms.
In addition to a subtle presentation of multiple personality,
most individuals with this disorder consciously withhold vital
clinical information about memory loss, hallucinations, and
knowledge of other personalities in order to avoid being la-
beled crazy. Others withhold information out of distrust.
Still others are totally unaware that they are symptomatic.
For instance, they may be completely unaware of alter per-
sonalities, and the time loss or time distortion which they ex-
perience may have occurred for such a long time that they
consider it to be normal.1 99
Alternatively, some therapists may tend to overdiagnose DID.2" 0
For example, a clinician fascinated by DID might, communicate his or
her fascination to the person being observed.20 1 As a result, cases
might be unconsciously shaped through subtle encouragement and
unintentional selective reinforcement. 20 2 One researcher "compared
clinicians' fascination with their DID cases to the reaction of new par-
ents; they can never miss an opportunity to show photographs, mov-
ies, or videos of their uniquely talented offspring, or to tell you about
193. Philip M. Coons, Child Abuse and Multiple Personality Disorder: Review of the Literature
and Suggestions for Treatment, 10 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 455, 459 (1986).
194. See Serban, supra, note 173, at 270.
195. See COHEN ET AL., supra note 24, at xxi.
196. See Lewis & Bard, supra note 4, at 748.
197. See id. at 749.
198. See Carlson, supra note 191, at 1035.
199. Coons, supra note 193, at 459.
200. See generally Kanovitz et al., supra note 6.
201. See NORTH ET. AL., supra note 66, at 33-34.
202. See id.; see also State v. Wheaton, 850 P.2d 507, 508 (Wash. 1993) (citing Saks, supra
note 6, at 400); supra note 175 and accompanying text.
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their latest cute trick. '2 0 3 Prosecutors may challenge a clinician's pre-
disposition to diagnose DID. For example in Scripps Memorial Hospital
v. San Diego, the prosecutor intended to prove that the diagnosing
physician had been criticized by his peers for overdiagnosing DID.2°4
In order to prove his assertion, the prosecutor requested all records
from the physician's employer to include: current employment status,
disciplinary action reports, peer review reports, patient complaints
and reprimands.2 °5
Evaluators may lack the time or expertise necessary to make an
accurate assessment of DID. A potential problem in court ordered
diagnostic interviews is that the evaluator may not have sufficient time
available to make an accurate diagnosis because of their heavy
caseload. A minimum of three to five hours of clinical examination is
often required in order to make an initial diagnosis of DID.20 6 Fur-
thermore, an evaluator should conduct at least three separate inter-
views to verify consistency of presentation.20 7 In the more difficult
cases, upwards of twenty clinical hours may be necessary in order to
make an accurate diagnosis. 208 Court-appointed forensic evaluators
often do not have this much time to spend with each defendant.
Therefore, defense attorneys should retain their own forensic
evaluator.
C. latrogenisis
Some clinicians assert that DID can be iatrogenically induced.20 9
Iatrogenesis occurs when medical treatment or therapy causes an ill-
ness or aggravates an existing illness."' Hypnosis and sodium amytal
purportedly can enhance vulnerability to suggestion. 21 1 Another
method by which personalities can allegedly be created is through the
use of leading questions, suggestions or positive reinforcement of
traumatic memories. 2  Comparatively, some clinicians and layper-
203. NORTH ET. AL., supra note 66, at 33.
204. 37 Cal. App. 4th 1720, 1723 (1995).
205. See id. at 1722-23.
206. See Philip M. Coons, latrogenesis and Malingering of Multiple Personality Disorder in the
Forensic Evaluation of Homicide Defendants, 14 PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS N. Am., No. 3, at 757, 763-
64 (1991).
207. See id.
208. See id.
209. See Merskey, supra note 6, at 328; see also Saks, supra note 64, at 46-48.
210. See THE SIDRAN FOUNDATION, supra note 3, at 11.
211. See Serban, supra note 173, at 278; see also Frank W. Putnam, (response to article by
Paul R. McHugh), 7/1/95J. Am. AcAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 960, 960 (1995).
212. See Savitz, supra note 10, at 201. For example, Elizabeth Loftus conducted an ex-
periment in which her research assistant convinced his younger brother Chris that he had
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sons feel that DID is an iatrogenic illness produced by a client to meet
the expectations of a therapist.2 13
In a number of recent lawsuits there have been allegations that
false memories 214 of childhood sexual abuse have been planted in pa-
tients' minds during therapy.215 Some therapists may be predisposed
to uncover histories of abuse in their patients. Therapists who believe
that abuse is at the heart of many psychological problems, and that
the typical abuse victim does not realize that she is a victim, may inter-
act with clients in a manner which may encourage memories of
abuse. 21 6 Some therapists, when confronted with patients who refuse
to admit abusive pasts, may tell them that tiey are in denial, en-
courage the clients to tell stories or imagine hypothetical incest
scenes, or interpret dream symbols as signs of abuse in an over-eager
attempt to confirm their theories. 21 7
Others assert alternatively that the theory of iatrogenisis in DID is
unsupported. 28  There is no confirmed case of iatrogenic DID.21 9
Although, hypnosis or amytal can produce some DID symptoms, they
can not produce the entire syndrome.220 To the contrary, scientific
evidence demonstrates that people with DID are significantly and gen-
uinely different on standardized psychological measures, structured
been lost at age five in a shopping mall and was found by a man wearing a flannel shirt,
something that never actually happened. See EtaZABEn LoFrus ET AL., THE MYrH OF RE-
PRESSED MEMORY. FALSE MEMORIES AND ALLEGATIONS OF SEXUAL ABUSE 97-102 (1994). Over
time, Chris "remembered" additional details of the event. See id, Two days after being told
the story, Chris described how scared he felt when he was lost. See iL Three days later he
claimed that he remembered his mother telling him never to do that again. See i. A
couple of weeks later Chris even described the man as wearing a blue flannel shirt and
glasses and having gray hair. See i&. When he was eventually told that the event never
occurred, Chris did not believe it. See id.; see also THE SIDRAN FOUNDATION, supra note 3, at
11.
213. See id.
214. The term false memory was developed in the early 1990's by the False Memory
Syndrome Foundation to describe memories that are not based on actual events. SeeTHE
SIDRAN FOUNDATION, supra note 3, at 10.
215. See Dalrymple v. Brown, 701 A.2d 164 (Penn. 1997); Halbrooks v. Moore, 1997 WL
198748 (Tex. App. Dallas 1997); S.V. v. R.V., 933 S.W.2d I (Tex. 1996) (each exemplifying
a false memory lawsuit).
216. See DONALD P. SPENSE, NARRATrIvE AND HISTORICAL TRUTH: MEANING AND INTERPRE-
TATION IN PSYCHOANALYSIS 94 (1982); cf Saks, supra note 64, at 51-54.
217. See Saks, supra note 64, at 51-54.
218. See PSYcHTRAuMA GLOSSARY, supra note 2, at 11.
219. See NORTH ET AL., supra note 66, at 29.
220. See Kluft, supra note 181, at 105; see also Steinberg et al., supra note 109, at 353;
Putnam, supra note 211, at 963 (no scientific evidence demonstrating that the entire
clinical syndrome can be induced).
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diagnostic interviews, clinical phenomenology, central and autonomic
nervous system activity, memory and cognition.22'
VI. CONCLUSION
DID is the mental disorder most strongly associated with child
abuse, especially sexual abuse.22 Because DID is often the result of
child abuse, a wide repertoire of diagnostic evidence should be admit-
ted when DID is alleged. Little evidence is frequently available con-
cerning sexual abuse because, due to the nature of the crime, there
are few witnesses. Althbugh it is true that some people may attempt to
simulate DID, a wider variety of evidence should be accepted in DID
cases in light of the abusive origins of the disorder. Because evidence
of child abuse is so elusive, especially years after its occurrence, all
diagnostic evidence in DID cases, both criminal and civil, should be
evaluated using a totality of the circumstances approach. Some con-
troversial procedures, such as hypnosis, may not be deemed reliable in
some jurisdictions. However, the value of controversial evidence
should not be ignored because, for example, hypnosis may be the only
effective method of eliciting alternate personalities in a short time
frame.22 -s Sometimes use of the more controversial evidence, such as
hypnotic and sodium amytal interviews, is the only way to establish a
DID diagnosis.24
.Controversial information may be counterbalanced with more
generally accepted evidence, if available. Safeguards can be used
which enhance the reliability of controversial procedures. For exam-
ple, videotaping can create a permanent record of diagnostic inter-
views. If videotaping is not practical, audiotaping could substitute.
Also, the use of leading questions should be avoided during interviews
to avoid the appearance of suggestibility, especially during hypnotic
225sessions. Also, repeated interviews can be conducted over a period
of time to add more credibility to the diagnosis. Appropriate safe-
guards enhance the probability that malingering, misdiagnosis or ia-
trogenesis will be detected. DID defendants often rely on
controversial diagnostic evidence because it is the only evidence avail-
able, due both to the nature of the disorder and to time constraints.
221. See Putnam, supra note 211, at 963.
222. See Ross et al., supra note 25, at 328.
223. See THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR THE STUDY OF DISSoctATION, supra note 91, at 3.
224. Arguably, even if controversial evidence is admitted in DID cases ultimately result-
ing in more acquittals, the defendants and society will benefit more from DID oriented
treatment.
225. See Lewis & Bard, supra note 4, at 750.
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Enhanced admissibility in multiple personality disorder cases would
support concepts of fundamental fairness.
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